This article examines regional and sectoral impacts of climate change under international climate agreements for abating GHGs. Using the dynamic Evaluation Model for Environmental Damage and Adaption (EMEDA), it examines interactions and heterogeneity among various countries. Specifically, we define a sub-global CO2 abatement game involving players from three regions (Japan, China and the U.S.). Simulated results show that: 1) in each scenario, overall costs of impacts in developed countries are less than those in developing nations, some of which lose more than 10% of their real GDPs; 2) an extra 0.8 degrees C temperature rise occurs in 2100 with China and the U.S. deviating from the scenario proposed by international society. This leads to increased climate damages in other developed countries by over 1% of real GDP; and 3) positive sectoral impacts can be found in several regions such as Japan, China, the U.S., EU, FSU and Africa. JEL-Classification: C68, C70, Q54
Introduction
The continued rising of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the worsening climate crisis have been attracting mounting attention for the last several decades. The Kyoto Protocol for mitigating global warming was adopted at the 3rd Conference of the Parties (COP3) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-FCCC) in 1997. Although international society has been facing many challenges regarding the implementation of required GHG reductions, the agreement in Kyoto nevertheless requires developed countries (Annex I parties under the Kyoto Protocol) to reduce emissions during the period of 2008 to 2012. However, in 2001, the Bush Administration of the United States (U.S.) rejected the protocol stating at that time that 1) emissions targets embodied in the Kyoto Protocol were arbitrary and not based upon science, and 2) no one could say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of warming for humanity, and therefore, what level must be avoided (O'Neill and Oppenheimer, 2002) . In addition to this failure to secure the participation of the U.S., China's carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions have rapidly increased with the dramatic expansion of the Chinese economy this century. The total amount of CO2 emissions for this country are now by far the largest in the world, even though China still belongs to the developing country (Annex II parties under the Kyoto Protocol) group with no binding commitments required under the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, after ratification of the protocol, the Japanese government stated at COP17 in 2011 that it was not willing to participate in an extension of the treaty. With such factors harboring the potential to significantly accelerate global warming and associated climate change, more and more emphasis across the world is being given to cooperation among these countries in the goal of attaining sustainable economic growth.
Since the early nineties many scholars have developed integrated assessment models (IAMs) in the goal of simulating the impacts of climate change (e.g., Frankhauser, 1995; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Nordhaus, 1991; Nordhaus and Yang, 1996; Tol, 1995 Tol, , 1999 Tol, , 2002 . In the literature (e.g., Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000) , most GHG emission scenarios are based on those from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and are calculated with IAMs aiming to maximize world welfare. On the other hand, Stern (2007) points out that the literature does not measure 'second-round' socio-economic responses to the impacts of climate change such as conflict and migration. When each region maximizes its own objective function-and not world social welfare-actual CO2 emissions of each region may deviate from mitigation targets determined by international society. This subsequent increase in GHG emissions has the potential to trigger more severe climate change impacts than those predicted. Therefore, it is necessary to construct a new scenario in which each region chooses the level of its CO2 emissions strategically, and then compare this with another scenario where CO2 emissions reduction targets are determined by the international community.
Several scholars have recently analyzed the CO2 abatements attained by climate policies among regions using both IAMs and game theoretical models. For instance, Babiker (2001) builds repeated games of CO2 abatement using a static 26-region and 13-commodity computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework. This is conducted to study the economic incentives and institutional issues governing the outcomes of a shortterm climate change policy package by the UNFCCC and the Berlin Mandate initiatives. Their study demonstrates that the achievement of a coalition among OECD regions might require the design of suitable trade instruments. Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) simulate cooperative game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations using a CLIMNEG world simulation (CWS) model derived from a RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996) . They state the necessary conditions for CWS that determine Pareto efficient investment and emission abatement paths under alternative regimes of cooperation among the regions. Finally, Yang (2003) implements a new algorithm in a RICE model to develop a feasible modeling approach applying closed-loop strategies to study the issues of reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions.
However, there are limitations to this literature. Few studies have focused on regional and sectoral impacts of climate change derived from the non-cooperative and bargaining behaviors for CO2 abatement among various countries. Also, few of them have employed multi-sector dynamic IAMs for analyzing strategic behaviors for CO2 emissions and their associated economic impacts, which typically vary across sectors. Attempting to address these deficiencies in the literature, in this paper we use a dynamic version of the Evaluation Model for Environmental Damage and Adaption (EMEDA), developed by Washida et al. (2013b) . Concentrating on the period 2004-2100, our goal is to investigate various consequences of global warming such as climate impacts and abatement costs by considering both cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors under multilateral negotiations on the mitigation of CO2 emissions. This study extends a dynamic EMEDA to simulate the world economy as eight regions with each region broken down further into eight sectors. To calculate annually the recursive competitive equilibrium, we have utilized the GTAP7 Data Base and the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software 1 . Additionally, we have added global warming and damage functions modified from DICE2010 and RICE2010 (Nordhaus, 2012) .
To formulate global climate negotiations, we define new CO2 abatement games where i) a set of players is formed by either China and the U.S., or the three regions of Japan, China and the U.S., ii) players' strategy spaces are determined by the rate at which CO2 emissions are reduced, and iii) payoff functions are calculated by the sum of discounted utilities calculated by a dynamic EMEDA. In this study, the CO2 emissions reduction rates in other regions not participating in the game are fixed. In a first game, we use a Nash equilibrium (N.E.) (Nash, 1950a (Nash, , 1951 where each player behaves non-cooperatively. We then run a bargaining game with a Nash bargaining solution (N.B.S.) (Nash, 1950b) where the disagreement point is determined by the Nash equilibrium. This bargaining solution represents the cooperative outcome of negotiations among all players. Finally, to compare scenarios we measure regional and sectoral impacts of climate change when specific regions either behave cooperatively or in self-interest. Specifically, we calculate competitive equilibria in several scenarios, including the Nash equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution for our games. Comparing these equilibria with an equilibrium in the benchmark scenario (where no region suffers climate damage) we obtain economic losses for each region and loss in real value-added for each sector in terms of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
2 . Simulated results from the CO2 abatement games indicate that: 1) each player chooses a lower rate of reduction for CO2 emissions at the Nash equilibrium than at the Nash bargaining solution; 2) simulated CO2 emissions under the reduction rates from the solutions emerging from both games are higher than official reduction pledges made by three countries; 3) an increase in the rate of time preference causes a decrease in the rate at which CO2 emissions are reduced; 4) overall economic impacts in the developed countries are less than those in the developing countries, some of which lose more than 10% of their real GDPs in each scenario; 5) an extra 0.8
• C temperature rise occurs in 2100 with China and the U.S. deviating from the scenario proposed by the international community. This leads to increased climate damages to the other developed countries, by more than 1% of real GDP; 6) for the secondary industry, the real value-added losses of both China and the U.S. are improved in the scenarios derived from game solutions, even if real GDP loss in China is worsened; and 7) positive sectoral impacts can be found in several regions such as Japan, China, the U.S., European Union (EU), former Soviet Union (FSU) and Africa.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a dynamic EMEDA structure and our CO2 emission scenarios. The CO2 abatement game and bargaining CO2 abatement games are defined in section 3, with section 4 presenting results of the dynamic EMEDA games. Section 5 illustrates regional and sectoral impacts of climate change. The last section then provides concluding remarks.
Methodology
With much scholarship providing assessments of the global and regional economic impacts of climate change, some focus on economic consequences from multiple sectors and regions. In this study, we use a dynamic EMEDA developed by Washida et al. (2013b) . This model builds upon the previous work (Washida, 2010; Washida et al., 2013a ), which we employ a static CGE model for simulating economic impacts resulting from global warming and adaptation costs.
Extension to dynamic EMEDA
In this study, we employ a dynamic EMEDA in which a competitive equilibrium is recursively calculated year by year from 2004 to 2100 3 . As can be seen from Table 1, 2 and  3 4 , we simulate the world economy as eight regions, with each region broken down into a (GTAP7)  1  Japan  JPN  2  China  CHN, HKG  3  USA  USA  4  EU25 WEurope  AUT, BEL, CYP, CZE, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, HUN, IRL, ITA, LVA,  LTU, LUX, MLT, NLD, POL, PRT, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, GBR, XEF, NOR, CHE  5  FSU EEurope  RUS, ALB, BGR, BLR, HRV, ROU, UKR, XEE, XER, KAZ, KGZ, XSU, ARM, AZE,  GEO  6  OAsiaOceania  IND, KOR, AUS, NZL, XOC, TWN, XEA, KHM, IDN, LAO, MMR, MYS, PHL, SGP,  THA, VNM, XSE, BGD, PAK, LKA, XSA, IRN, TUR, XWS  7  OAmerica  CAN, MEX, XNA, ARG, BOL, BRA, CHL, COL, ECU, PRY, PER, URY, VEN, XSM,  CRI, GTM, NIC, PAN, XCA, XCB  8  Africa  NGA, SEN In this paper, we have sought to improve a dynamic EMEDA on five levels from EMEDA (Washida, 2010) . First, we adopt capital accumulation by sector in each region 5 . Second, we introduce population growth into labor supply 6 . Third, we introduce the Hicks-neutral technological progress into the value-added production function 7 . Fourth, we consider CO2 emissions derived from production 8 . Finally, we build a global warming model modified from DICE2010 and RICE2010 (Nordhaus, 2010 (Nordhaus, , 2012 9 .
A CO2 emissions reduction scenario
In this subsection, we define a series of scenarios depicting various reduction rates for world CO2 emissions. In the base scenario, each region gradually increases the rate of CO2 emissions reductions according to Figure 1 . Figure 2 represents change in atmospheric temperature in both the base scenario and the no-reduction scenario where no region reduces CO2 emissions. In a dynamic EMEDA, the temperature rise in 2100 emerges as approximately 2.31
• C relative to the year 1900 in the base scenario and 4.43
• C in the no-reduction scenario. Therefore, it can be seen that attaining the base scenario is sufficient for limiting global warming as per the current goal 5 In each period a present capital stock is the sum of the previous capital stock minus depreciation of the previous capital stock plus a previous gross investment. We set the depreciation rate of each sector to four percent per annum following the GTAP7 database. 6 Population growth rates are calculated by world projections from the United Nations (UN) data. 7 The growth rates of technological progress are calculated by fitting the estimated values of real GDP in a dynamic EMEDA to those of real GDP in the scenario of Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSP). In this scenario, both potential damage of global warming and marginal cost of mitigation are low (SSP1), which is in turn estimated by the OECD ENV-linkage model (SSP Database, 2012).
8 CO2 emissions in 2004 are calculated by input energy data in the GTAP7 Data Base (Lee, 2008 ). Effects of non-CO2 GHGs are given exogenously according to DICE2010 (Nordhaus, 2012) . Technology progress in abatement is calculated according to RICE2010 (Nordhaus, 2010 (Nordhaus, , 2012 . 9 The global warming model consists of equations on radiative forcing and climate change, sea level rise (SLR) and non-SLR damage functions, and abatement cost functions. The damage function is determined in accord with temperature rise and SLR with the abatement cost function for each region also being an increasing function of reduction rates for CO2 emissions. • C in 2100 relative to pre-industrial temperatures 10 .
Game analyses
In this section, we concentrate on the three players of Japan, China and the U.S. All of these three countries are characterized by unwillingness to participating in a post-Kyoto Protocol in spite of the fact that they collectively account for approximately half of world CO2 emissions. First, we define a CO2 abatement game and a Nash equilibrium. We then explore a bargaining CO2 abatement game and a Nash bargaining solution. Finally, we calculate these solutions using both the games and a dynamic EMEDA.
Nash equilibria for a CO2 abatement game
This sub-section provides an overview of the one-shot and non-cooperative game among regions, now referred to as a CO2 abatement game. The game is defined by (N, S, u). A set of players is N , defined as a subset of {Japan, China, U SA}. S = ∏ r∈N S r is strategy space where each player r in N has their strategy space S r . Payoff function is u = (u r ) r∈N where the payoff function for each player r is
where u r represents the sum of discounted utilities of player r when the rate of time preference is ρ. In this paper ρ is 1%, 3%, 5% or 10%. u r,t represents the utility of region r in period t, which is defined as
where C r,t is consumption, S r,t is savings, which is equivalent to gross investment, and G r,t is government expenditures 11 . One example is that of a case where each of China and the U.S. chooses specific strategies regarding reduction rates for CO2 emissions. The set of players is N = {China, U SA}. We assume that S r consists of eleven strategies of CO2 reduction rates µ r = (µ r,t ) 2100 t=2004 . Each region's strategy consists of CO2 emissions reduction rates for that region, running from the period 2004 through to 2100. We have calculated strategies in accord with reduction rates, which are compared to CO2 emissions in the base scenario
) r∈N . Therefore, the strategy space for each player r, S r = {µ r (0), . . . , µ r (10)}, is given in Table 5 12 . Note that CO2 emissions reduction rates 10 This range derives from stabilization scenarios under Category I (IPCC, 2007). 11 In the tables and figures of this paper, for simplicity we normalize the payoff to zero obtained when each player chooses no CO2 reduction. 12 In this paper we refrain from adopting the base scenario µ ′ as a strategy because each region always chooses a lower reduction rate than that of strategy 1 in the game. Therefore each region can choose a strategy of higher reduction rates than that of strategy 1. See Appendix B for details. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between the two players and the other six regions in a two-player CO2 abatement game.
In the same vein, we have also considered the case of three regions participating in a three-player game with the set of players defined as N = {Japan, China, U SA}. Here we assume that each player has six strategies, provided in Table 6 . For payoff functions in equation (1), we adopt the same function as that from the two-player game.
Next, we define a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950a (Nash, , 1951 in our CO2 abatement game. A strategy profile may be considered a Nash equilibrium if each player's strategic choice is the best response to the strategies taken by the other players. Formally, a Nash equi-
−r ) for all r in N and s r in S r where (s r , s −r ) = s and s −r = (s r ′ ) r ′ ∈N \{r} . That is to say, no player prefers to change her strategies at a Nash equilibrium. In the case of the two-player game, both China and the U.S. have no incentive to change CO2 reduction rates at a Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium therefore can be regarded as a non-cooperative solution since each player acts in self-interest to maximize individual payoffs.
It should be pointed out incidentally that a Nash equilibrium is not always unique, as in some games multiple Nash equilibria may exist. Furthermore, a Nash equilibrium for other games maybe empty 13 . Table 6 : Strategies of Japan, China and the U.S. in the Three-Player Game
Nash bargaining solutions for a bargaining CO2 abatement game
In this subsection, we consider a case where players negotiate with each other, using the notations N , S and u, already defined in the previous subsection.
Here the bargaining CO2 abatement game consists of (N, F, d), with N again being the set of players. A feasibility set F is defined as
where s r is a player r's strategy in S r . This set consists of points representing the tuples of feasible payoffs by negotiation among players. The disagreement point will be set as
With B evidentially a subset of F , for each player a point of B is always better than or equal to the disagreement point d. A point (b r ) r∈N in B is a Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950b) It is known that a Nash bargaining solution emerges as a result of the following maximization problem (Nash, 1950b) 
(5) Figure 4 shows a Nash bargaining solution at point C in the case of two players, 1 and 2. D is a disagreement point, with the curve representing the objective function of the above problem. We assume that the disagreement point in a bargaining CO2 abatement game, in turn derived from the CO2 abatement game, is given by payoff function values at a Nash equilibrium in the CO2 abatement game 15 . In this bargaining CO2 abatement game, all players negotiate between each other concerning strategies taken for CO2 emission reduction rates from the year 2004 through to 2100. The disagreement point derived from a Nash equilibrium may then be implemented if some players disagree to a Nash bargaining solution. On the other hand, the Nash bargaining solution may be implemented if all players are in agreement.
The derivation method of two solutions
When using a dynamic EMEDA, there are four steps to finding a Nash equilibrium and a Nash bargaining solution. Firstly, obtaining payoffs of players u = (u r (µ)) r∈N for each strategy profile µ = (µ r ) r∈N in S, we calculate the sum of discounted utilities using a dynamic EMEDA for each tuple of strategies. Next, we find a Nash equilibrium µ * = (µ * r ) r∈N through a payoff matrix, derived from the first step. Thirdly, we define a bargaining CO2 abatement game by setting a Nash equilibrium orμ to the disagreement point. That is, 
Game results
Simulated EMEDA results reflect both direct and indirect impacts. This is because CGE models incorporate interrelationships among regions, allowing us to also consider the indirect consequences when EMEDA focuses on global warming damages. As already mentioned, this research simulates a dynamic EMEDA to determine reduction rates of CO2 emissions for the three regions of Japan, China and the U.S. From hereon, we will discuss simulated dynamic EMEDA results by region for both reduction rates and economic impacts of climate change. Note that for this EMEDA simulation we use GAMS.
Solutions are calculated in two kinds of games: a two-player game in which N = {China, U SA} and a three-player game in which N = {Japan, China, U SA}.
Two-player game with cooperative non-player behavior
First, we consider a case where the rate of time preference, ρ, is three percent. By calculation, we can find that both China and the U.S. always choose strategy 3 for payoff maximization 16 . This indicates that the unique Nash equilibrium µ * = (7.5%µ
With this Nash equilibrium, we consider a bargaining CO2 abatement game. A feasibility set F given by the dynamic EMEDA constitutes the set of points shown in Figure 5 . In this figure, the horizontal axis represents payoffs for China, with the vertical axis being those for the U.S. By combining the two countries' choices of strategies, it is possible to illustrate the relationship between the two countries' behaviors. This figure shows change in payoffs by dashed curves when China changes its strategy in response to that of the U.S., while the solid curves represent payoff curves when the U.S. changes its strategy in accord with China's. By the curves we obtain an envelope like utility possibility frontier 17 . In this figure, the Nash bargaining solution is given by the point of contact between this envelope and the utility curve
18 . All results for solutions emerging from both the CO2 abatement and bargaining CO2 abatement games between China and the U.S. are compiled into Table 7 , with solutions displayed as CO2 emission reduction rates. As can be seen from Table 7 , we find in all cases that each player chooses a lower CO2 emissions reduction rate at the Nash equilibrium than at the Nash bargaining solution. Therefore it is clear that both China and the U.S. choose positive reduction rates of CO2 emissions in all scenarios where there is a rate of time preference. However, the level of reduction rates in the solutions is lower 16 The payoff matrices of China and the U.S. are given by For instance, when the rate of time preference is 3%, as may be seen in Table 7 , the CO2 reduction rate of China is 7.5% of the base scenario at the Nash equilibrium and 15% at the Nash bargaining solution. Regarding the U.S., the reduction rate of CO2 emissions is 15% of the base scenario at the Nash equilibrium and 35% at the Nash bargaining solution. These solutions suggest that it is difficult to attain CO2 abatements adequate for the goal of limiting post-industrial world temperature rises to within 2.0-2.4
• C without suitable environmental policies in each region.
As the rate of time preference increases, the reduction rate remains either constant or decreasing in all solutions. This can be explained by the tendency of each player to consider current utility as more important than the utility of future periods, which diminishes as the rate of time preference increases. Figure 6 provides a comparison of temperatures resulting from solutions emerging from other scenarios. The temperature rise at the year 2100 is approximately 3.21
• C relative to the year 1900 at the Nash equilibrium and about 3.12
• C in the Nash bargaining solution. Three important results may be drawn from Figure 6 : 1) a 0.1
• C temperature rise may be prevented through cooperation of countries; 2) the temperature falls by less than 0.9
• C compared to the no-reduction scenario in the event of a payoff maximization for China and the U.S. even if the other regions choose CO2 reduction rates in the base scenario; and 3) even if cooperation is attained through a Nash bargaining solution, the excess rising temperature is about 0.8
• C compared to the base scenario.
Rate of time preference Nash equilibrium Nash bargaining solution 1% (7.5%µ 
Two-player game with non-cooperative behavior from nonplayers
Next, we consider a case where each of the other regions refrains from reducing individual CO2 emissions. The results for solutions emerging out of both the CO2 abatement game and the bargaining CO2 abatement game between China and the U.S. are compiled into Table 8 19 . A comparison of Table 7 and 8 reveals that China chooses to increase its CO2 abatements for lower rates of time preference in both Nash equilibrium and Nash bargaining solution. This is because China, which has chosen lower CO2 reduction rates than the U.S., becomes willing to increase its CO2 emissions reduction levels to mitigate more aggressively the climate damage driven by mounting world CO2 emissions. Figure 7 provides a comparison of temperature rises ensuing from solutions emerging from the scenarios where the other regions refrain from reducing CO2 emissions. The temperature rise at the year 2100 is approximately 4.35
• C relative to the year 1900 at the Nash equilibrium and about 4.28
• C at the Nash bargaining solution. With a discrepancy of less than 0.2
• C between the no-reduction scenario and the Nash bargaining solution, it becomes apparent that even if both China and the U.S. were to voluntarily reduce CO2 emissions, a rapid rise of the average global temperature is unavoidable.
Rate of time preference
Nash equilibrium Nash bargaining solution 1% (15%µ 
The three-player game
Results of the CO2 abatement game and the bargaining CO2 abatement game among Japan, China and the U.S. are shown in Table 9 20 . In this table, in all cases each player chooses a lower reduction rate for CO2 emissions at the Nash equilibrium than at the Nash bargaining solution. It therefore becomes apparent that all three regions choose positive CO2 emission reduction rates in all cases of a rate of time preference. However, the level of the reduction rates in the solutions is lower than those in the base scenario as of the two-player game. For example, when the rate of time preference is 3%, the CO2 reduction rate for Japan is 5% at the Nash equilibrium and 25% at the Nash bargaining solution relative to the base scenario. Similarly, the CO2 reduction rate for China and the U.S. are respectively 10% and 20% at the Nash equilibrium and 15% and 30% at the Nash bargaining solution. Note that in the Nash bargaining solution Japan usually chooses strategy 5, which is the maximum reduction rate in Japan's strategy space, S Japan . Compared with Japan's strategy at a Nash equilibrium, strategy 5 results in higher reduction rates at the Nash bargaining solution than at the Nash equilibrium. This indicates that the CO2 negotiations have large effects on rate at which Japan chooses to abate CO2 emissions. Figure 8 shows temperature rises corresponding to solutions from the two-player and 20 The payoff matrices of the three players in the three-player game are shown in Appendix A.
Rate of time preference
Nash equilibrium Nash bargaining solution 1% (5%µ Table 9 : Nash Equilibrium and Nash Bargaining Solution in the Game of Japan, China and the U.S.:(Japan,China,USA)
Figure 8: Comparison of Temperature Increase (
• C Relative to 1900) in the Two-Player and Three-Player Games three-player games. When comparing the results from both games, there is not a significant difference between the CO2 emissions reduction rates for China and the U.S. This is because the level of Japan's emissions is lower than the other players, especially in future periods.
Economic impacts of climate change
In this section, we define a benchmark scenario where each region suffers no climate damage. This scenario is then compared with the others, including those in the game solutions. To measure the overall economic impacts of climate change by region, we first focus on each region's rate of change in real GDP losses. Then, we calculate the rate of change in loss in real value-added by sector to determine discrepancies between regions and sectors. These loss ratios can be interpreted as the sum of the climate damage and the abatement costs. 21 . Focusing on real GDP in 2050, the best scenarios for each player are the no-reduction scenario (None) for China, the Nash equilibrium (N.E.) in the two-player game for the U.S., and finally, the Nash bargaining solution (N.B.S.) in the three-player game for Japan. Additionally, since higher reduction rates require more abatement costs, it can be seen that all players prefer the no-reduction scenario and game solutions to the base scenario (Base). This is especially so for China who bears more abatement costs (i.e., higher CO2 emissions reduction rates) than developed countries 22 such as Japan and the U.S. This discrepancy in abatement costs between developed countries and China can be explained by the result that the rate of economic growth in developed countries is lower than in the other countries. Note that when Japan participates in the three-player game, this leads to an increase in real GDP of Japan because abatement costs drop as a result of cutting the rate at which CO2 emissions decline. Table 11 represents rates of change in real GDP for all regions and scenarios at the year 2100. Here the Nash bargaining solution in the two-player game constitutes the best outcome for China, whereas it is the base scenario for Japan and the U.S. For the other regions, real GDP losses in the EU and other America increase by more than 1% as China and the U.S. deviate from the base scenario. On the other hand, FSU and other Asia and Oceania undergo an increase of less than 1%. For Africa, real GDP loss decreases.
Regional impacts
Comparing Tables 10 and 11 , we find that each region prefers higher CO2 reduction rates in the year 2100 than in 2050. This is due to worsening climate damage caused by continual temperature rise. Comparing the no-reduction scenario to other scenarios in the solutions for the three-player games, real GDP for Japan and the U.S. increases in both years as CO2 emissions are reduced, while Chinese real GDP decreases in 2050. This is for the reason that an increase in abatement costs for CO2 reduction exceeds the amount incurred from climate damage in China. In contrast, in developed countries abatement costs are justified. This is for the reason that increased climate damages are superior to the costs required to pursue higher CO2 emission reduction rates.
These results suggest that a reduction in CO2 emissions is more beneficial to developed nations than for other countries. This implies that international cooperation for climate change mitigation requires higher abatement costs in developed countries in order to ensure fairness between developed and developing countries.
Next, we measure effects of CO2 reduction on the world economy from 2004 to 2100 in a situation where certain regions behave either cooperatively or in self-interest. Several scenarios are developed in the games including the Nash equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution. Figure 9 compares net present value (NPV) of real GDP loss for these scenarios with respect to the benchmark where each region suffers no climate damage and the discount rate of real GDP loss is 3 percent per annum. Comparing the game solutions to no-reduction scenarios, we find that real GDP losses of Japan and the U.S. are improved by participation in the CO2 abatement games, though China experiences a deterioration in real GDP. Considered at a global level, the base scenario emerges as the least attractive since total abatement costs are higher than in the other scenarios. Figure 10 shows the ratio of NPV of real GDP loss in each region with respect to the benchmark scenario. For China, FSU, other Asia and Oceania, other American countries and Africa, CO2 reductions lead to a deterioration in real GDP loss ratio. Especially other Asia and Oceania and Africa increase their real GDP loss ratio rapidly. On the other hand, for Japan, the U.S. and EU, each real GDP loss ratio is improved through CO2 reductions. Moreover, comparing the scenarios in the solutions for the three-player games to the base scenario, we find that all players improve real GDP loss ratio by participation in the CO2 abatement games. This is especially so for China, who can reduce its damage by more than 3% NPV of its real GDP.
Finally, Table 11 shows annual change in real GDP loss ratios for each player, in several scenarios. Comparing the base scenario with that in the Nash bargaining solution for the two-player game (NBS2), both China and the U.S. emerge as better off in most years. This is due to a reduction in abatement costs, as lesser CO2 reduction rates are pursued in NBS2. It should be noted that Japan comes out worse off because world CO2 emissions increase as a result of strategic behaviors from China and the U.S. Furthermore, Japan finds itself in an advantageous situation as a result of choosing lower CO2 reduction rates in NBS3 through comparing NBS3 with NBS2. Note that real GDP for the other two players rarely changes. The lesson here is that a region's participation in the game can prove beneficial for itself, but not so for the others.
Sectoral impacts
Previous literature has emphasized that damages or benefits from climate change differ not only by region, but also by sector (e.g., Eboli et al., 2010; Tol, 2002; Washida et al., 2013a) . In this subsection we determine in more detail the extent to which losses in real value-added for each sector may be improved or worsened in each region when reducing CO2 emissions. To obtain rates of change for real value-added loss by sector in the dynamic EMEDA, a range of scenarios are compared to the benchmark. First, we measure amounts of the NPV of losses in real value-added for all regions. Figure 12 presents the NPV of real value-added losses experienced in each region by sector from 2004 to 2100. As can be seen, losses in real value-added for several sectors in Japan, China, the U.S., EU and other America are improved by pursuing CO2 reductions, in comparison to the base scenario. However, all sectors in the other three regions worsen.
In Figure 12 , it can be confirmed that in some regions such as Japan, the U.S. and EU, sectoral damage in the services category such as transport and communication (TransComm) and other services (OthServices) accounts for the majority of losses. On the other hand, sectoral damage in manufacturing categories such as light manufacturing (LightMnfc) and heavy manufacturing (HeavyMnfc) and the services category are most significant in other regions such as China, FSU, other Asia and Oceania, and other American countries. For Africa, the extraction sector experiences the most severe losses.
Next, we calculate rates of change in the NPV of real value-added loss for all regions. Results for the period 2004-2100 for all scenarios including the no-reduction scenario, the base scenario, Nash bargaining solution for the two-player game, and that of the three-player game are displayed in Figure 13 23 . The following results are obtained from this figure. Firstly, in all regions and for the majority of sectors except extraction and heavy manufacturing, the real-value added for the no-reduction scenario is higher than that for the base scenario. This shows that excessive CO2 emissions abatement leads to a deterioration of overall economy. Secondly, when Japan, China and the U.S. participate in the CO2 abatement games, a reduction in CO2 emissions boosts real value-added in several regions. Positive sectoral impacts can be found in several sectors such as heavy manufacturing in Japan, agriculture in the U.S., extraction in China and EU, forestry in FSU, and other services in Africa. Thirdly, in light manufacturing, real value-added consistently decreases in response to reductions in CO2 emissions. Therefore, it could be argued that additional policies may be required in order to improve the economies of all sectors. Fourthly, for agriculture, real value-added for both the U.S. and EU rapidly decreases as CO2 is reduced, while both Japan and China see an increase since the diminution of their imports of agricultural goods exceeds that of their exports. Fifthly, for the services category real value-added for developed countries such as Japan, U.S. and EU see an increase as the domestic demand for services expands as a result of CO2 reductions. Finally, real value-added for the extraction sector diminishes in most regions except Africa. This probably reflects the large share represented by the extraction sector in the overall African economy, which will be accelerated by rapid economic growth on SSP1. These results suggest that global warming mitigation may dramatically alter the global economic structure.
Finally, we consider the annual change in real value-added loss ratios for each player by industry. Figure 14, 15 and 16 show the transition of real value-added loss ratio for China, the U.S. and Japan, respectively. The three industries in these figures are defined as follows: primary industry (PI) consisting of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; In Figures 14, 15 and 16 we find the following results. Firstly, there is always a player who experiences a decrease in real value-added loss for each industry. As shown in Figures  6 and 8 , damages from climate change and global warming become more severe as time passes and the temperature rises. This means that climate damages of each player can be mitigated by trade among regions. Secondly, for the heavy manufacturing in particular in the secondary industry, the real value-added losses of China and the U.S. are improved in the scenarios derived from the Nash bargaining solutions compared to the others. Finally, Japan's real value-added loss is also improved in the primary and tertiary industries. These results suggest the varying degree of importance placed on the profit maximization for different industries in each region. 
Concluding Remarks
In summing up the main lessons from this study, simulated results from the dynamic EMEDA using the CGE approach and game theory indicate that: 1) each player chooses a positive lower reduction rate of CO2 emissions at the Nash equilibrium than at the Nash bargaining solution; 2) simulated CO2 emissions under the reduction rates emerging as solutions from both games are higher than official reduction pledges made by Japan, China and the U.S.; 3) an increase in the rate of time preference causes a decrease in the reduction rates of CO2 emissions; 4) total climate impacts in developed countries are less than those of the developing countries, some of which lose more than 10% of their real GDPs in each scenario; 5) an extra 0.8
• C temperature rise occurs by the year 2100 with the U.S. and China's deviation from the scenario proposed by international society. This leads to increased climate damages in other regions, most particularly in other developed countries, who experience a loss of up to 1% in real GDP; 6) for the secondary industry sector, real value-added losses of both China and the U.S. are improved in the scenarios derived from game solutions, even if real GDP loss of China is worsened; and 7) positive sectoral impacts may be observed in several regions such as Japan, China, the U.S., EU, FSU and Africa.
These results suggest that it will be difficult to attain CO2 abatements adequate for the goal of limiting post-industrial world temperature rises to within 2.0-2.4
• C without suitable environmental policies. It should therefore be noted that when considering abatement costs, a reduction in CO2 emissions is not necessarily beneficial to all countries involved. Especially in the case of developing countries, real GDP tends to decrease as CO2 emissions are reduced. This is principally because abatement costs are higher in these countries in all scenarios, and the economies in developing countries are forecasted to grow rapidly throughout this century. Moreover, deviation from international agreements on CO2 reduction causes additional damage to each region. It is therefore essential that this unfairness should be corrected in order to secure the participation and cooperation of developing countries in the goal of reducing global CO2 emissions.
In this study, we have assumed that each region maximizes its payoff, which is given by the sum of discounted utilities. In reality, however, the interests of several parties will affect the outcome of agreements regarding CO2 emission reductions. Our results imply that there is a possibility that some sectors in each region may suffer much economic damage as a result of climate agreements; a scenario which is characterized by the Nash bargaining solution. Thus this prospect of incurring economic losses constitutes a potential hampering to climate agreements as parties in the sector in question seek to preserve their own interests. This situation therefore illustrates the difficulty in reaching an agreement for CO2 reductions.
Appendix A. Payoff Matrices
Appendix A shows payoff matrices calculated by the dynamic EMEDA. In each 
